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O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.:
Confirmation That Claim Construction Is the
Duty of the Court
In O2 MICRO INTERNATIONAL LTD. V. BEYOND INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY CO.,1 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified when a court is required to con-
strue seemingly ordinary patent claim terms.2 The O2 Micro district court had re-
fused to interpret the terms “only if” and instead allowed the terms to go to the jury
without any instruction from the court. The jury found that the defendant had
infringed, and the judge issued an injunction.3 The Federal Circuit held that the
district court erred because a court is required to construe terms when either: 1)
the terms have more than one ordinary meaning; or 2) failure to define the terms
does not settle the parties’ dispute.4 The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision and remanded the case so that the terms “only if” could be construed
before being presented before a jury.5 In doing so, the Federal Circuit properly
reaffirmed the court’s duty to construe terms, even if they are seemingly ordinary
terms.6 Although the issue of district courts’ local rules was not addressed by the
Federal Circuit, this decision should ensure that local rules meant to reduce the
number of terms construed are not merely arbitrary decisions, and that the lower
courts construe terms in a manner that properly protects the patentee’s rights.7
© 2010 Jessica L.A. Marks.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010; M.Be., Bioethics, University of
Pennsylvania, School of Medicine; B.A., Biology, University of Pennsylvania, School of Arts & Sciences.
1. 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
2. Id.; see also infra Part III.
3. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1358.
4. Id. at 1361.
5. Id. at 1366.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
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O2 MICRO INT’L LTD. V. BEYOND INNOVATION TECH. CO.
i. the case
O2 Micro owned three patents8 directed to inverter controllers (“ICs”).9 ICs convert
low voltage direct current (“DC”) to high voltage alternating current (“AC”).10 ICs
are often used to convert a laptop battery’s DC current to AC for lamps that back-
light laptop screens.11 During prosecution of the patents, O2 Micro added the
words “only if” to many of their claims to overcome a rejection by the Unites States
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).12 Thus, the claims that were finally patented
stated that O2 Micro claimed ICs comprising a feedback loop that controls the
circuit’s switches “ ‘only if said feedback signal is above a predetermined
threshold.’ ”13
Beyond Innovation Technologies (“BiTEK”) produced and sold four types of ICs
accused of infringing O2 Micro’s patents.14 The feedback loops on all four of
BiTEK’s devices controlled the circuit while the lamp was powering up and before
the feedback signal had reached the predetermined threshold.15 Additionally, one of
BiTEK’s ICs also had a feedback loop that controlled the circuit if the power
dropped below the threshold level for less than thirty-two microseconds.16
O2 Micro filed suit against BiTEK in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, Judge Ward presiding, accusing BiTEK’s devices of infringing on
O2 Micro’s patents.17 The construction of the terms “only if” was the main dispute
in the lower court.18 O2 Micro, advocating a liberal interpretation of “only if,” ar-
gued that a person of ordinary skill in the art would know that “only if” only
applied to steady state operation, so BiTEK’s devices infringed.19 The defendants,
attempting to convince the court to adopt a strict interpretation of the terms, ar-
gued that “only if” should be construed by the court to mean “exclusively or solely
8. O2 Micro owns U.S. Patent No. 6,259,615 (filed Nov. 9, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,396,822 (filed July 13,
1998); and U.S. Patent No. 6,804,129 (filed Feb. 11, 2004). O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1354. All patents can be found
using the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Information Retrieval System, available at http://por-
tal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.
9. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1354.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1355–56; see also infra note 108 (discussing the significance of this addition).
13. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1356; see also infra note 108 (discussing the significance of this addition).
14. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1356.
15. Id. at 1356–57.
16. Id. at 1357.
17. Id. at 1354, 1356.
18. See infra Part III; see also infra notes 106–08 (discussing the other issues reviewed by the Federal
Circuit).
19. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360.
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in the event that”20 or “never except when.”21  BiTEK argued that since the feedback
loops in its devices operated at other times, its devices did not infringe.22
At the Markman hearing,23 the district court did not agree with either interpreta-
tion of the words “only if,” finding that the words did not need construction be-
cause they had “ ‘a well-understood definition, capable of application by . . . the
jury.’ ”24 The jury instructions allowed the jurors to construe “only if” for them-
selves, without objection from BiTEK.25 The jury was further instructed that they
could find BiTEK either directly infringed, or infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents.26 The jury found BiTEK was infringing, and Judge Ward granted O2
Micro a permanent injunction against BiTEK.27 BiTEK appealed the decision to the
Federal Circuit, Judges Lourie, Clevenger, and Prost presiding.28
ii. legal background
A. A Primer on Patent Litigation
The Framers included patents in the Constitution in order to encourage inventors
to share their inventions with the world.29 In return, the patentee is granted the
right to exclude others from using his invention for 20 years.30 A patentee files an
20. Id. at 1357. Using this construction, the patents cover only circuits with feedback loops that would
exclusively operate the circuit when the threshold power level is met or that would operate the circuit solely in
the event that the threshold power level is met. Id. at 1356–57.
21. Id. at 1357. BiTEK’s co-defendant, SPI/FSP, proposed this construction, which would mean that the
patents covered only circuits with feedback loops that would never operate the circuit except when the thresh-
old power level is met. Id. at 1356–57.
22. Id.
23. A Markman hearing is held in a patent case before the jury instructions go to the jury to construe
disputed terms. See infra text accompanying notes 39–45 (providing an explanation of Markman hearings).
24. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1357.
25. Id. at 1357–58; see also infra note 106 (discussing the importance of BiTEK’s failure to object).
26. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1358; see also infra note 108 (discussing the importance of the decision to allow
the jury to consider infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
27. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1354.
28. Id.
29. The Constitution originally recognized the power of patents “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In the past several decades, the Supreme Court has reiterated many
times the philosophy that a patent is “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.” See Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoid-
ance of monopolies . . . [to promote] the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ”); Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[P]atent law seeks to foster and reward invention; . . . promotes disclo-
sure of inventions . . . [and] the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the
public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
480 (1974) (“The patent laws . . . . have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products
and processes of manufacture into the economy.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–31
(1964) (indicating that patents are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right “to
exclude others from the use of his invention” for a time using uniform federal standards “to promote invention
while at the same time preserving free competition”).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1–2) (2006) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention. . . . [S]uch grant shall be for a
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 169
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O2 MICRO INT’L LTD. V. BEYOND INNOVATION TECH. CO.
application with the PTO describing his new invention and listing what the paten-
tee is actually claiming.31 A PTO examiner reviews the application to ensure that
every listed claim is useful, novel, and non-obvious.32 The examiner often rejects
some or all of the claims.33 The patentee can then amend the claims to avoid rejec-
tion by disclaiming some part of the original claim so that the amended claim is
entirely useful, novel, and non-obvious.34 A patent is then issued only for those
final claims.35
Once a patent is issued, if the patentee finds that someone else is practicing his
patent, the patentee can sue that person for infringement.36 The suit is filed in a
federal district court, seeking an injunction, monetary damages, or both.37 An in-
fringement dispute often turns on the definition of certain terms used in the
claims; if a term is defined the plaintiff’s way, the claim covers the device and the
defendant is infringing; if defined the defendant’s way, the claimed invention and
the device are two separate devices, and the defendant is not infringing.38 To define
terms, the district court will hold a Markman hearing,39 usually before the start of
the trial.40 All term construction must be completed before the jury receives its
instructions.41 Local rules determine the form of the Markman hearing.42 Several
courts have instituted different ways to limit the number of terms they will con-
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed . . . .”).
31. 35 U.S.C. §§ 2, 101.
32. Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents 38 (2008); see also 35 U.S.C. § 131.
33. Nard, supra note 32, at 38; see also 35 U.S.C. § 132(a).
34. See generally Rajiv P. Patel, An Introduction to U.S. Patent Prosecution, in Fundamentals Pat. Prose-
cution 2007, at 161, 170–72 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series
No. 11260, 2007) (describing the possible rejections patent examiners can give a patent application).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 151.
36. Id. § 281.
37. Nard, supra note 32, at 787; see also id. § 281.
38. See Cheryl Lee Johnson, The Continuing Inability of Judges to Pass Their Markman Tests: Why the
Broken System Leaves Judges Behind, Confused and Demoralized, in Markman Hearings & Claim Constr. in
Patent Litig. 2008, at 65, 75–76, 126–27 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-941, 2008)
(explaining why claim construction, defining the scope of what the patentee deems as his invention, is so
important in patent law cases and also noting that once claim construction has taken place, many cases can be
decided by summary judgment).
39. See generally Johnson, supra note 38 (explaining the recent history of claim construction and how the
Supreme Court’s decision in Markman led to the requirement of a Markman hearing).
40. Id. at 125 (“A 2002 survey of the ABA’s Intellectual Property Law section found claim construction in
78% of cases was performed after discovery but before trial . . . . Three years earlier, another ABA survey found
most claim construction rulings (58%) occur after discovery but before trial . . . .”); see also Julie A. Petruzzelli,
Before the Markman Hearing—Discovery, Timing, Alternatives and Challenges in Multi-Party Cases, in How to
Prepare & Conduct Markman Hearings 2007, at 77, 90–91 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook
Series No. G-907, 2007) (“[C]ourts may choose to construe the claims: (1) before the close of fact discovery; (2)
in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction; (3) at the end of all discovery; (4) in the context of
summary judgment; or (5) following trial, prior to jury instructions. . . . Of course, local rules or practices may
limit the options which are available.”).
41. Johnson, supra note 38, at 124–25 & n.294.
42. Petruzzelli, supra note 40, at 90–91.
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strue, including straightforward numerical limitations and less obvious time limita-
tions on the Markman hearing.43
Once the terms are construed, the case can move forward and the jury receives
instructions that include the court’s construction of the terms.44 All appeals of the
verdict are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.45 The Federal
Circuit’s decision is normally the final decision.46
Prior to O2 Micro, two competing doctrines existed regarding the construction
of claim terms.47 The Markman doctrine held that construction is a matter of law
and so judges must construe all terms for the jury.48 The Phillips doctrine held that
ordinary terms need no special construction.49 The line that divided claim terms
into ordinary and non-ordinary was not clearly drawn, so many courts had diffi-
culty determining which terms needed to be construed and which did not.50 A brief
review of the Markman and Phillips, and Elekta Instrument51—relied on by the
district court—cases illuminates the reasoning behind each of these doctrines.52
43. Johnson, supra note 38, at 125. (“[S]ome individual judges have increasingly refused to construe more
than a handful of terms and/or have set strict time limits on the hearings. . . . Whether these judicial practices
are lawful or deny due process has not been thoroughly vetted.” (footnote omitted)). Some district courts’ local
rules also incorporate time constraints or limits on the number of terms the court will review. See, e.g., N.D.
Cal. Pat. R. 4-1(b), 4-3(c), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov, (follow “Local Rules Changes—Effective
12/01/09” hyperlink; then follow “Local Rules 12-09.pdf” hyperlink) (requiring the parties to limit the
Markman hearing to “the 10 terms likely to be most significant to resolving the parties’ dispute”); see also
Johnson, supra note 38, at 106 n.207 (listing courts with similar local rules).
44. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 124 n.294 (noting that the only deadline for the construction of terms is
that it occur before the jury receives its instructions because the jury must be told what the claims mean).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006) (noting the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals). Con-
gress granted it jurisdiction to hear patent appeals originally to create uniformity in patent decisions. Robert P.
Taylor, Patent Law in Flux: Echoes of the Supreme Court, in 14th Annual Inst. on Intellectual Prop. Law, at
93, 98–99 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-947, 2008) (“Congress established the Federal
Circuit in 1982 to effect a widely perceived need for more consistent application of federal patent law. At the
time, the regional circuit courts of appeals varied widely in their handling of patent disputes, often leading to a
race to the courthouse in important cases.” (footnote omitted)).
46. Until recently, the Supreme Court rarely reviewed patent cases. See Robin L. McGrath, Recent Develop-
ments in Patent Law and Its Impact on Patent Litigation, in Patent Litig. 2008, at 95, 99 (PLI Intellectual Prop.,
Course Handbook Series No. 14977, 2008) (“Without question, the Supreme Court has been much more active
lately in the patent arena, addressing no less than five patent-related decisions in the last three terms alone. In
each of these instances, the Supreme Court has reversed the Federal Circuit, in some cases overruling long
standing Federal Circuit doctrines.”).
47. See infra Parts II.B–C.
48. See infra Part II.B; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
49. 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also infra Part II.C.
50. See, e.g., infra notes 85–86.
51. Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also infra Part
II.D.
52. See infra Parts II.B–D.
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B. Markman: Claim Construction Is a Matter of Law
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,53 the Supreme Court of the United States
reviewed a case between Markman, the holder of reissue patent 33,05454 claiming a
method of inventory control for a dry-cleaning business, and Westview Instru-
ments (“Westview”), which used an inventory control method accused of infringing
Markman’s patent.55 Markman’s system would tag dry-cleaning items with
barcodes, and then employees could scan the articles of clothing, called “inventory”
in the patent, with a scanner as the clothes went through the process of being dry-
cleaned.56 Westview’s system maintained an inventory of receivables by tracking
and recording invoices and transaction totals.57 Markman argued that “inventory”
could mean both “ ‘cash inventory and actually physical inventory of articles of
clothing.’ ”58 Westview argued that “inventory” as Markman used it only referred to
articles of clothing, so their device, which tracked invoices and could not track
clothing, did not infringe.59 The case was submitted to the jury without judicial
construction of the term “inventory,” and the jury found for Markman.60 However,
the district court entered a directed verdict and found for Westview.61
Markman appealed, arguing that the directed verdict was an improper substitu-
tion of the court’s construction of the term over the jury’s construction of the
term.62 The Federal Circuit reviewed Markman’s Seventh Amendment right to a
trial by jury and held that “the interpretation of claim terms [is] . . . the exclusive
province of the court and the Seventh Amendment [is] consistent with that
conclusion.”63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and applied several different tests before
affirming the Federal Circuit’s decision.64 Because patent cases had traditionally
been tried before a jury, the drafters of the Seventh Amendment may have intended
to extend the right to a trial by jury to patent cases as a whole.65 However, the
Supreme Court needed to take the analysis a step further to determine if every part
of a patent case had to go to the jury or if particular issues within a patent case
53. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
54. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 33,054 (filed Aug. 28, 1987).
55. Markman, 517 U.S. at 374–75.
56. Id. at 374.
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537–38 (E.D. Pa. 1991)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 376 (“The Seventh Amendment provides that ‘[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .’ ” (citing U.S. Const.
amend. VII)).
63. Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
64. Id. at 376, 384, 388–90 (describing the analysis the Court applied).
65. Id. at 376–77.
172 journal of business & technology law
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could be decided by the court.66 The Court reasoned that a portion of a patent law
case must be tried by a jury if: 1) historically, a jury decided claim construction in
order “to preserve the ‘substance of the common-law right of trial by jury;’”67 2) the
question is one of fact, which is the province of the jury;68 or, 3) functional consid-
erations indicate that a jury would be better suited to determining the meaning of
claim terms.69
Regarding the common-law right to a trial by jury, at the time that the Seventh
Amendment was passed, claims as they are today did not exist.70 When the Seventh
Amendment was passed, the patentee only submitted a specification explaining
what he believed was his invention and did not include a separate list of claims.71
Additionally, very few cases from that period dealt with patent law in general,
much less the issue of whether a patentee had a right to jury construction of
terms.72 Therefore, the historical record was too paltry to support the notion that
patentees had a common-law right to jury-construction of terms.73
Regarding the question of fact, the Court determined that claim construction
was a question of law and was rightfully decided by the judge for several reasons.74
First, the Court had consistently ruled that construing the claims as written in the
patent was the province of the court; the court’s role did not remove the role of the
jury because the jury would still determine the character of the thing invented as
compared to what was claimed on the patent.75 Second, a patent is a legal instru-
ment, and as such, the duty of interpreting it falls to the court.76 Therefore, the
question of fact analysis also indicated that patentees did not have a right to claim
construction by juries.77
Finally, regarding the functional considerations, the court found several more
reasons why a judge would be better suited to construe claims than a jury.78 First, a
judge is more familiar with construing written instruments, so he is presumably
better at understanding legal documents than jurors.79 Second, more specifically, a
judge is more familiar with construing patent terms, which are often very technical,
and the training judges gain by virtue of their jobs would make them better pre-
66. Id. at 377.
67. Id. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987)).
68. Id. at 384–85.
69. Id. at 388.
70. Id. at 378–79.
71. Id. at 379. A patent’s specification is the “ ‘full description of the invention and its operation which
would show the scope of the patent.’ ” Nard, supra note 32, at 13 (footnote omitted).
72. Markman, 517 U.S. at 379–80.
73. Id. at 381–82.
74. Id. at 384–88.
75. Id. at 386–87.
76. Id. at 388.
77. Id. at 384–88.
78. Id. at 388–91.
79. Id. at 388.
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 173
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pared than jury members to construe claims properly.80 Third, allowing judges to
construe terms can lead to uniformity in treatment that cannot be obtained using
juries.81 Considering these reasons, the Court found that functional considerations
did not indicate that juries should be in charge of claim term construction.82
Therefore, the Supreme Court agreed that claim construction is a matter of law,
which is rightfully the province of the court.83 The Markman case led to a change in
patent law litigation; after Markman, courts began having Markman hearings to
construe terms before the decision was sent to the jury.84 Many courts began con-
struing seemingly ordinary terms to comply with the Markman rule.85
C. Phillips Decision: Ordinary Terms Need No Construction
Even though Markman required judges to construe terms, some courts still refused
to construe every single term before them.86 These courts often relied on the rea-
soning behind Phillips v. AWH Corp.,87 a later case where the Federal Circuit stated
that “[i]n some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language . . . may be readily
apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little
more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly under-
stood words.”88
In Phillips, Edward Phillips owned patent 4,677,798,89 which covered steel-shell
panels with baffles that would make a very strong wall when welded together.90
Phillips originally entered into a deal with AWH to sell the panels, but after that
deal ended in 1990, Phillips accused AWH of continuing to practice his patent
without his permission.91 AWH said they were not infringing on Phillips’ patent
because the baffles on their panels were all perpendicular to the panels, and the
baffles in Phillips’ patent were at angles other than 90°.92 The patent claims all
stated merely the word “baffles” without any further angular restrictions, and no
80. Id. at 388–89.
81. Id. at 390–91.
82. Id. at 391.
83. Id.
84. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 126.
85. See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1141–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s
construction of the term “board”); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1350–52
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming the lower court’s construction of “golden-brown”), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S.
394 (2006).
86. See, e.g., Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that “melting” needs no construction); Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,
244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court did not need to construe “irrigating” and
“frictional heat”).
87. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
88. Id. at 1314.
89. U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (filed Apr. 14, 1986).
90. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1309.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1310.
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special angle for “baffles” was expressed in the rest of the specification.93 Therefore,
the court needed to define the term “baffles” using its common and ordinary
meaning and not construe it in the way urged by AWH.94 Using the plain and
ordinary meaning of baffles, which does not have an angular restriction, the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the proper construction of “baffles.”95 Thus, judges began relying
on Phillips and its progeny in order to forego construing terms when their plain
and ordinary meanings were sufficient to understanding what the patentee has
claimed, despite the holding in Markman.96
D. Elekta Decision: Courts Do Not Have to Construe Ordinary Terms
The Federal Circuit in Elekta Instrument v. O.U.R. Scientific International, Inc.97
went even further to say that if a patentee wanted to be his own lexicographer, the
patent’s specification must clearly redefine the term; however, “[a]bsent an express
intent to impart a novel meaning, claim terms take on their ordinary meaning.”98
Elekta Instrument owned patent 4,780,898 for a machine used to treat patients
with brain cancer by focusing gamma radiation on their tumors and destroying the
malignant growths.99 Their claims included the limitation that the radiation beam
channels would be placed on the machine “only within a zone extending between
latitudes 30°–45°.”100 O.U.R. Scientific said that they were not infringing on Elekta’s
patent because their machine had the radiation beam channels within a zone that
ranged from 14°–43°.101 They further argued that because the Elekta patent’s ma-
chine “only” had beam channels between 30°–45°, their machine was not covered
by the Elekta patent and they were not infringing.102 The Federal Circuit agreed that
“only” had an ordinary meaning of “solely” or “exclusively,” and, without any clear
indication in the patent that the term “only” had a special meaning, the court was
required to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “only.”103 Therefore, the dis-
93. Id. at 1324–28.
94. Id. at 1328.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Appelra Corp. v. MicrosMass, UK Ltd.,
186 F. Supp. 2d 487, 524, 526 (D. Del. 2002) (finding that “maintain,” “maintaining,” and “whereby” did not
need to be construed because their meanings were “self-evident”); Multimedia Patent Trust v. Microsoft Corp.,
2008 WL 4975873, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2008) (Markman order holding that “encoder,” “encoder output
signals,” “applied next frame signals,” and several other terms did not need to be construed, even when the two
parties disagreed on the meaning of those terms); Vision Advancement, L.L.C. v. Vistakon, 2007 WL 275572, at
*13 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2007) (finding that “continuously” needed no construction because the term could be
given its “plain and ordinary [meaning]”).
97. 214 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
98. Id. at 1307.
99. Id. at 1304.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1306.
103. Id. at 1307.
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trict court erred by granting Elekta’s summary judgment motion for infringement
and the case was remanded for further proceedings, a decision the Federal Circuit
described as tantamount to granting O.U.R. Scientific’s motion for summary judg-
ment for non-infringement.104
iii. the court’s reasoning
The main issue considered by the Federal Circuit in O2 Micro was whether the
lower court erred in failing to construe the terms “only if.”105 The Federal Circuit
considered three other issues, finding that: 1) if an issue has been fully litigated
earlier in the trial, a party does not need to continue to object throughout the rest
of the trial to preserve the issue for appeal;106 2) arguments can be added at the
appellate level if they refer to the same claim construction dispute;107 and, 3) a jury
cannot consider infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents when a patentee
has not rebutted the Festo presumption.108 However, these other three issues are
relatively straightforward applications of already-existing standards;109 only the
court’s decision involving claim construction of ordinary terms created new law.110
Regarding the claims construction issue, the Federal Circuit found the lower
court’s refusal to construe the terms to be in error because, although “Elekta Instru-
ment may not require the court to construe [“only if,”] Markman does.”111 The
Federal Circuit noted that claim construction is an attempt to define the scope of
the patent and, because it is a matter of law, it should be decided by the court.112
The court will generally give terms their “ordinary and customary” meaning as
104. Id. at 1309.
105. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
106. Id. at 1358–59. BiTEK’s failure to object to the jury instruction did not fail to preserve their right to
appeal the issue to the Federal Circuit. Id. Since the claim construction had been fully litigated at the Markman
hearing and the lower court had given no indication that it would deviate from that decision, BiTEK did not
need to present further objections to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. at 1359.
107. Id. at 1359–60. BiTEK was allowed to present a new construction of the terms “only if” to the Federal
Circuit because this was not a precluded new issue. Id. Because the new construction was merely a new argu-
ment in support of the same construction issue and the opposing party had adequate notice of the argument,
the Federal Circuit agreed to entertain BiTEK’s new construction proposal. Id.
108. Id. at 1363–66. The Federal Circuit found that the lower court erred in allowing the jury to consider
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1566. O2 Micro added “only if” during prosecution to
overcome a rejection based on prior art. Id. This led to the presumption that the terms “only if” disclaimed
circuits that had limitations similar to the prior art it was attempting to overcome. Id. Since O2 Micro did not
overcome that presumption, the judge erred in allowing the jury to consider the doctrine of equivalents to find
infringement. Id.
109. See id.; see also supra notes 106–08.
110. Previously, there had been no clear standard as to when courts needed to construe ordinary terms. See,
e.g., infra notes 115–16. The O2 Micro case is an attempt to clarify the standard. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361
(clarifying that while the Federal Circuit’s previous case Elekta Instrument did not require construction, its
Markman decision did require the court to construe the terms “only if”).
111. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361.
112. Id. at 1360 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
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determined by a person of ordinary skill in the art who has reviewed the intrinsic
record.113 In an attempt to avoid the flood of disputed terms that would come in
future cases, the Federal Circuit did note that sometimes terms are so ordinary that
the term needs no special construction by the court.114 In addition, the Federal
Circuit noted that there were many cases that have construed seemingly obvious
claim terms,115 but there were also many other cases that show that a court does not
need to “parse the meaning of every word in the asserted claims.”116 The issue
before the Federal Circuit in O2 Micro was how to tell the two types of cases
apart—how a judge is supposed to know when a term is ordinary but still needs
construction.117
The Federal Circuit held that even if a term has an ordinary meaning, the court
may still need to construe that term if it has “more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or
when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dis-
pute.”118 In the instant case, the Federal Circuit held that O2 Micro and BiTEK were
not arguing over the “meaning” of the terms “only if,” but instead were arguing
over the scope of the claim when the ordinary meaning of “only if” was applied to
the claims.119 Since reliance on the term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning did not resolve the
parties’ dispute because the parties still argued over the scope of the claims, and
since claim scope is a matter of law, the district court in O2 Micro erred by not
construing the claims for the jury.120 The Federal Circuit vacated both the jury
decision and the subsequent injunction against BiTEK, remanding the case for fur-
ther construction of the terms “only if.”121
iv. analysis
In O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology, the Federal Circuit
held that courts must construe ordinary terms when the parties are actually argu-
ing over the scope of the claim and not just the meaning of the term.122 To help
lower courts determine when the argument is actually about scope, the Federal
Circuit suggested that the courts consider whether the term has more than one
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1362.
115. See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1141–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“board” needs construction);
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“golden-brown”
needs construction), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
116. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360; see, e.g., Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v.
Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“melting” needs no construction); Mentor H/S, Inc. v.
Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court did not need to
construe “irrigating” and “frictional heat”).
117. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1363.
122. Id. at 1361.
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ordinary meaning or if failure to construe the term fails to resolve the dispute.123
This decision was correct because, in addition to the reasons cited by the Federal
Circuit, the lower court’s interpretation of Elekta Instrument and Phillips was mis-
taken.124 Additionally, though not considered by the Federal Circuit, refusal to con-
strue terms that are central to the parties’ dispute is a violation of due process,125
and this decision will help counter the disturbing trend of arbitrary cut-offs in
claim construction cases.126
A. The Federal Circuit Was Correct in Its Interpretations of Markman, Phillips,
and Elekta Instruments
The Federal Circuit was correct in its reasoning in O2 Micro.127 The way the lower
court interpreted Elekta Instrument and Phillips placed them in direct conflict with
Markman.128 In essence, the lower court interpreted Phillips and Elekta Instrument
to mean129 that once a term was deemed ordinary, construction of that term was
prohibited, and such terms were best left to jury interpretation.130 However,
Markman says that construction of disputed terms was required and should be
done by the court, not the jury.131 Thus, the lower court’s interpretation turned a
potential legal conflict into a true legal conflict.132
123. Id.
124. See infra Part IV.A.
125. The due process clause is part of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be
. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”) (emphasis added).
126. See infra Part IV.B.
127. See supra Part III.
128. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
129. Although not addressed by the Federal Circuit, this interpretation of Elekta Instrument was mistaken.
See infra Part IV.B.
130. Even after acknowledging that the terms “only if” were the central cause of the dispute between the two
parties, the district court still chose to let the jury decide the outcome because the terms were ordinary. O2
Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
131. See supra Part II.B.
132. See Carlos E. Gonzalez, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing Combination of Formalism and Anti-
Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 80 Or. L. Rev. 447, 458 (2001).
The key distinction between true and potential legal conflict centers on the interpreted meanings
attributed to the legal norms in question. Where two legal norms, as interpreted, demand mutually
exclusive outcomes, we have an instance of true legal conflict. When, in contrast, two legal norms
would demand mutually exclusive outcomes if one or both norms were interpreted broadly, but in
fact do not demand mutually exclusive outcomes because one or both norms are given narrow inter-
pretations, we have an instance of potential legal conflict.
Thus, a true conflict between legal norms is present when one norm, as interpreted, requires or
permits what another norm prohibits, or vice versa. In such cases, enforcement of one norm necessa-
rily means the non-enforcement, or even the nullification, of another. The two norms in question, in
other words, demand mutually exclusive outcomes. Return to the hypothetical case in which legal
norm A requires or permits X, while legal norm B could plausibly be interpreted to prohibit X (or
require not-X). Were norm B so interpreted, norm B would stand in a posture of true legal conflict
with norm A.
Id.
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The Federal Circuit employed proper legal interpretation by determining that
Markman required construction of “only if” even if Elekta Instrument did not.133
The lower court, in error,134 believed Elekta Instrument could be interpreted in two
ways, and it chose to interpret it in the broadest way.135 The broadest interpretation
is that ordinary terms should never be construed by the court.136 A narrower inter-
pretation is that ordinary terms sometimes do not need construction by the court,
but construction is not prohibited.137 The Federal Circuit, perhaps realizing that the
narrow interpretation would allow Elekta Instrument and Phillips and Markman to
work harmoniously together,  overruled the lower court’s interpretation.138 Al-
though it is within judicial discretion to determine whether a broad or narrow
interpretation is appropriate, there is a strong tendency for the courts to use a
narrow interpretation to avoid a true legal conflict.139 Given the relative impact the
Markman and Phillips decisions have had on patent law,140 the Federal Circuit was
right to reconcile their tenets with the relatively minor holding in Elekta
Instruments.
Therefore, by finding a way to reconcile Markman and Phillips with Elekta In-
struments, the Federal Circuit properly decided O2 Micro.
B. The Lower Court’s Misinterpretation of Elekta
Although overlooked by the Federal Circuit, the District Court erred in its interpre-
tation of Elekta Instrument.141 Because the Federal Circuit focused on the require-
ments of Markman in making their decision, the Federal Circuit never clarified
whether the district court in O2 Micro interpreted Elekta Instrument incorrectly.142
The lower court’s interpretation of Elekta Instrument was wrong because Elekta
Instrument does not free the court from construing terms at all; it only states that
courts are not forced to construe them in a special manner when the patentee has
not clearly indicated that he wishes to be his own lexicographer.143 In Elekta Instru-
ment, the patentee wanted the court to apply a special meaning to the disputed
term “only,” and the accused infringer wanted the court to construe the term in its
133. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
134. See infra Part IV.B.
135. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361. Although this appears to be what the lower court believed, the lower
court’s interpretation of Elekta Instruments suffered a second error, which is discussed in Part IV.B.
136. Thus, a disputed ordinary term would still be left unconstrued for the jury. Id.
137. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361.
138. Id.
139. Gonzalez, supra note 132, at 470.
140. See Johnson, supra note 38 (discussing the invention of the Markman hearing in response to the
Markman decision); Holly L. Bonar, Is Something Amiss? A Commentary on the Aftermath of Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 88 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 513, 513 (2006) (noting that Phillips had not led to as expansive
changes as first expected, but acknowledging that Phillips has become a heavily cited case).
141. Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
142. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361.
143. Elekta Instrument, 214 F.3d at 1307–08.
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ordinary manner.144 The court decided to construe the term in its ordinary manner
because nothing in the patent indicated that “only” had any other special mean-
ing.145 This is an important distinction from the O2 Micro district court’s reading of
the case. The district court in O2 Micro used Elekta to stand for the prospect that
the court does not need to construe ordinary terms.146 In actuality, the Elekta court
did take the time to construe the disputed terms before sending it to the jury; even
if the court merely decided to use the term’s ordinary meaning, it still construed
the term.147 The Elekta court used a dictionary to find that “only” had the ordinary
meaning of “solely” or “exclusively” and applied that construction to the claims.148
Therefore, in Elekta Instrument, the court did not refuse to construe the term; it
chose to construe the term to have its ordinary meaning.149
Furthermore, the landmark Phillips case articulates that courts must construe
disputed terms.150 The Federal Circuit in Phillips stated that courts are welcome to
apply the ordinary meaning of a term and even to use nothing else to help them
construe the word than their own general knowledge.151 However, they never indi-
cated that courts could flatly refuse to construe a word at all if it is the center of the
parties’ dispute.152 The important point is that the previous decisions have allowed
judges to give very little reasoning and do very little work in researching the ordi-
nary meaning of a term, but the court must at least construe the term using its
ordinary definition before submitting it to the jury.153
Therefore, because the lower court in O2 Micro erred in its interpretation of
Elekta Instrument, the Federal Circuit was correct in reversing its decision and re-
manding the case for construction of the terms “only if.”
C. The Impact of the O2 Micro Decision
In making its decision in O2 Micro, the Federal Circuit may have also inadvertently
effected a stop to the growing trend of district courts enacting local rules to reduce
their patent caseload.154 Some district courts that deal with patents frequently have
created time limits for Markman hearings and have even limited the number of
terms they are willing to construe in a Markman hearing.155 However, the Constitu-
144. Id. at 1306–07.
145. Id. at 1307.
146. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361.
147. Elekta Instrument, 214 F.3d at 1307.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1307–09.
150. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
151. Id. at 1314 (“In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language . . . may be readily apparent even
to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than [but still requires] the application
of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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tion forbids property from being taken without due process of the law.156 Because
patents are a form of property,157 and because the Supreme Court has already indi-
cated that the due process for determining the boundaries of that property is a
court’s determination of the meaning of the patent’s disputed terms,158 a court’s
arbitrary refusal to construe terms and settle the parties’ dispute violates the paten-
tee’s right to due process.159 Therefore, this Federal Circuit decision upholds the
tenets of due process.160 Furthermore, because the Federal Circuit is often the final
word in determining patent law,161 the O2 Micro decision will force district courts
to construe all disputed terms, even if only taking the time to construe them using
their ordinary meanings, instead of arbitrarily capping the number of terms they
will review.162
v. conclusion
In O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovations Technology, the Federal Circuit
properly held that the lower court erred in failing to construe the terms “only if”
because seemingly ordinary terms must be construed when there is more than one
definition for the term or when failure to construe the term does not solve the
parties’ dispute.163 However, the Federal Circuit failed to also note that the lower
156. See supra note 125.
157. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (indicating
that a patent right “is a property right”); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (“[Patents] are surely included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be
deprived by a State without due process of law.”); United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187
(1933) (indicating that “[a] patent is property”); Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (indicat-
ing that “[a] patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land”).
158. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
159. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ., 527 U.S. at 642 (“[Patents] are surely included within the
‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process of law.”).
160. The assertion is best understood with an illustration. Suppose that Peter has a patent on a “blue”
machine. Peter finds out that Ingrid is using a “teal” machine. Peter thinks Ingrid’s machine is so similar to his
patented blue machine that Ingrid may be infringing on his patent. Peter then takes Ingrid to court arguing
that “blue” means “all hues between green and violet” and thus a “teal” machine is covered by his patent. Ingrid
says she is not infringing because “blue” means “colors on the RGB scale that only use blue and do not contain
red or green.” With this definition, Ingrid says she is not infringing. In this scenario, the term “blue” is a
seemingly ordinary word, but each party has a definition of “blue” that changes the scope of the claim.
If the court finds that “blue” does in fact mean “teal,” then Peter’s property, the patent, is protected
because Peter was afforded due process in court. If the court finds that “blue” does not mean “teal,” then
Ingrid’s property is not taken away from her because the court properly afforded Ingrid the judicial process due
to her in determining that Peter did not own the intellectual property that she is practicing.
However, if the court decides to do nothing because “blue” is an ordinary term that needs no construc-
tion, due process is not served. As stated in Markman, the meaning of claim terms is a matter of law, and by
refusing to construe a term, a court inappropriately allowed a question of law to go to the jury. Markman, 517
U.S. at  372. This is not the proper process for protecting either Peter’s or Ingrid’s property. If the jury decides
the ‘wrong’ way, then either Peter’s or Ingrid’s Fifth Amendment right would be violated.
161. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., supra note 43 and accompanying text.
163. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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court erred in its interpretation of Elekta Instrument v. O.U.R. Scientific Interna-
tional, Inc.164 Nevertheless, this case was appropriately decided and the ruling
should encourage courts to protect the due process rights of parties in patent
suits.165
164. See supra Part IV.A.
165. See supra Part IV.B.
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